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Introduction

Paul Marcus and Alan Rosenberg

It would be folly to attempt to define psychoanalysis on the basis of technique or practice. Techniques change over time and the essence of psychoanalysis lies in its ideas concerning the nature of its inquiry and its views of man, not its technical procedures.

—Arnold M. Cooper

What is psychoanalysis? Considering the question carefully, one realizes that the answer is neither straightforward nor simple. Psychoanalysis has meant different things to different people, in different places and at different times in its history. How one defines psychoanalysis and who one considers a psychoanalyst will differ greatly depending on the assumptions that one starts with and where one is culturally, geographically, and linguistically situated. Psychoanalysis is best understood as a "floating signifier," a term that is historically contingent. In a certain sense, then, the question What is psychoanalysis? can be answered only in a context-dependent and open-ended manner. The situation is made more complicated by those who consider themselves part of the psychoanalytic community yet are prone to intense conflicts, fierce loyalties, rivalries, and even hatreds concerning what they believe constitutes the "fundamentals" of psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis has also generated its share of heretics and dissident thinkers who have been excommunicated by the psychoanalytic establishment. One has only to remember the Freud-Klein controversies and the Lacanian episode to see how the psychoanalytic establishment tries to silence dissent. Tolerance for difference does

not seem to be one of the qualities that institutional psychoanalysts have in abundance.

In the most general sense, then, this volume provides a forum for psychoanalytic scholars from a wide range of theoretical perspectives to answer the question "What is psychoanalysis?" Contemporary psychoanalysis, says historian Fred Weinstein, "far from being a monolithic entity that can compel loyalty to a single perspective, as critics still sometimes describe it, is too fragmented to be constituted as a unified discipline." There was a time in the United States, he writes, "even rather recently, when proponents of 'mainstream psychoanalysis' could insist on the primacy of Freud's drive theory and the version of the world associated with it, man as pleasure seeking" in an erotically tinged universe (1990, p. 26). All this has changed. Today there are competing psychoanalytic versions of the world, markedly different ways of understanding the human condition. As Jay R. Greenberg and Stephen A. Mitchell point out, "Psychoanalytic models rest upon . . . irreconcilable claims concerning the human condition" (1983, p. 404).

Some examples: Kohut's theory of the self has transcended the classical boundaries of drive theory and the compartmentalization of the mind into agencies of continuing combat. Kohut suggests that classical psychoanalytic theory views the individual as "Guilty Man," who continuously struggles toward fulfillment of his drives. He lives under the sovereignty of the pleasure principle, endeavoring to reconcile inner conflict, and he is often frustrated in his goal of tension reduction by his own deficits or those of the people who brought him up. By dramatic contrast, Kohut's self theory formulates the concept of "Tragic Man," who struggles to fulfill the aims of his nuclear self. That is, Tragic Man is attempting to express the pattern of his very being, the ideals, ambitions, and self-expressive goals that transcend the pleasure principle (Monte 1980, p. 217). A second example: the British psychoanalytic tradition established by Melanie Klein, W. R. D. Fairbairn, D. W. Winnicott, Wilfred Bion, and others tends to characterize man as fundamentally object seeking. Relationships provide the primary data of psychoanalytic inquiry, for "psychology may be said to resolve itself into a study of the relationships of the individual to his objects" (Fairbairn, 1943, p. 60). Object relations theorists thus view the central human problematic not in terms of pleasure seeking, but in terms of establishing and maintaining gratifying and lasting relationships to one's objects.

In contrast, the hermeneutic critique of psychoanalysis advocated by

such thinkers as Paul Ricoeur, Donald P. Spence, and Roy Schafer focused still another psychoanalytic version of the world, and posited man as meaning-seeking. Psychoanalysis, they argue, is not a biological science as the classical model assumes, it is essentially an interpretive discipline. Thus, psychoanalysis must fundamentally address the meaning with which people endow their daily experience. From this perspective, the central problem for the person is to create a coherent narrative of self-identity.

To make matters more complicated, though all three versions of man—as pleasure seeking, object seeking, and meaning-seeking—have their advocates, there are important differences within each perspective. For example, Klein, Fairbairn, Bion and Winnicott are all, broadly speaking, object relations theorists in the British tradition, but they diverge from each other in many respects. As Weinstein notes, throughout the many acrid experiences that Freudian psychoanalysis had with C. G. Jung, Alfred Adler, Wilhelm Reich, Melanie Klein, Otto Rank, Karen Horney, Harry Stack Sullivan, and Erich Fromm, there was something that could still be called "mainstream psychoanalysis." But that situation no longer exists: the different theories are not "translatable"; the different perspectives share little more than concepts of unconscious mental processes, repression, and transference (1990, p. 27). Moreover, these different traditions are markedly divergent in the way they understand these basic concepts (e.g., Schafer's conceptualization of the unconscious differs from the Kleinian or object relations conceptualization and even more from a Jungian one). In other words, psychoanalysis today lacks the kind of unifying, authoritative core that proponents of the drive theory always provided. In Thomas Kuhn's terms, it lacks a disciplinary matrix for its activities as a science. The absence of any agreed on way to assess all the different psychoanalytic versions of the world is one important criterion of this deficiency (Weinstein, 1990, p. 27).

This situation has not gone unnoticed within the discipline: Schafer writes that "psychoanalysis emerges as an array of master narratives that dictate specific and incommensurable storylines for the interpretive work of analysis" (1992, p. xvii). Marshall Edelson notes with dismay the discipline's "preoccupation with new psychoanalytic theories" that in part reflects a "theory in crisis" characterized by "profound malaise" (1988, p. xiv). And Nathan G. Hale in his widely acclaimed book *The Rise and Crisis of Psychoanalysis in the United States* describes the "psychoanalytic crisis of the last decade" as "a crisis of clashing theories, competing

modes of therapy, and uncertainties of professional identity" (1995, p. 360). Indeed, there may be much truth to Edith Kurzweil's claim that "the fragmentation of psychoanalytic theory proves . . . that the Freudians primarily are united by their profession rather than by their ideas" (1989, p. 283).

Given this proliferation of theories, each one clashing with the other as it tries to assert the supremacy of its "truths," the crucial question to ask is How does the reader decide which theory is "true"? We want to make clear where we stand on this important question. We also hope that our comments will help the reader avoid becoming overwhelmed or demoralized in the face of the "veritable Babel of theories," as the current psychoanalytic landscape has been characterized (Kurzweil, 1989, p. 256).

We believe that there are no facts that can be established outside a given theory; that is, all facts are theory laden. Rival ways of narrating facts within a language cannot be evaluated from a theory-neutral perspective, since the theory that generates them may be incommensurate. As Jane Flax has pointed out, we must be aware of the constructed nature of all narratives (1993, pp. 3-4). As there are no theory-neutral, uncontested methods for making a determination about which theory is "true," readers will have to make their own judgments about this issue. Says Flax,

truth is discourse specific, the rules that determine what counts as truth in one domain may not apply in another . . . a discourse as a whole cannot be true or false, because truth is always contextual and rule dependent. No master rules or decision procedures are available that could govern all discourses or resolve conflicts among choices between them. Hence, truth claims may be incommensurate across discourse. (p. 40)

It should be emphasized that this way of conceptualizing truth has the support of many in the philosophical community. For example, the well-known analytic philosopher Donald Davidson emphasized the same point when he indicated that justificatory factors are always internal to discourse, are always intralinguistic: "[I]n]othing . . . no thing, makes sentences and theories true: not experience, . . . not the world, can make a sentence true" (Prado, 1995, p. 49).

The importance of appropriating such a discourse-relative approach for evaluating the truth claims of each theory is that it opens up space for reasonable dialogue between theoretical perspectives. By not having to

consider each theory in terms of traditional philosophical correctness-criteria and absolute claims to truth, the reader is less likely to reflexively dismiss alternative viewpoints. Rather, he is more inclined to make the intellectual effort to empathize with, and critically reflect on, different viewpoints. Thus, this book aims to help psychoanalysts and psychotherapists understand the "metaphysical commitment" and "fundamentally different a priori premises" about the human condition that underlie their clinical theory and practice. "Only by an analysis of an analyst's vision of human experience can his theoretical position be accurately assessed" (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983 p. 348). Although Freud (1964, p. 158) wrote that "Psychoanalysis, in my opinion, is incapable of creating a weltanschauung of its own"—an "intellectual construction that solves all the problems of existence uniformly on the basis of one overriding hypothesis"—we believe that each theoretical position to be represented in this book has attempted to do just that, and its clinical concepts reflect this goal. For example, as Jones (1991, p. 135) has pointed out, theories of transference are implicitly theories of the nature of the self: the self fashioned by its defenses against instincts (Freud), the self formed by its inner objects (Klein), the self structured by its internalized relationships (Kohut), "the self as a narcissistic misrecognition, represented through the symbolic order of language" (Lacan) (Elliot, 1994, p. 113). Another example: Winnicott had a markedly different view of culture and individual development, which was the basis for a perspective on religion, illusion, creativity, reality, and treatment that radically differed from Freud's. As Dale M. Moyer (1995, p. 460) points out, "Freud described the process of individual development in our culture as a tragedy of disillusionment through instinctual renunciation, separation, loss, and mourning. Winnicott saw the growth of the individual as 'a creative process of collaboration' (Phillips, 1988, p. 101) and our culture as 'a medium for self-realization' (ibid., p. 119)." Moreover, Moyer indicates, Freud formulated "his theory around the core catastrophe of castration; 'for Winnicott it was the annihilation of the core self by intrusion, a failure of the holding environment' (ibid., p. 149)." Psychotherapists need to be more aware of the fact that what they are providing for their patients is a conception of life, a particular story about the nature of the world and what it means to be human in that world. What constitutes "cure" in psychoanalysis can thus be viewed as the ideal of what it means to be human in that particular version of the world.

The acrimony in psychoanalytic circles among colleagues with different theoretical orientations is a complex phenomenon that warrants at least brief comment. Such behavior is a time-honored tradition, beginning with Freud's harsh treatment of those who disagreed with him. Ernest Jones's personal attacks on Sandor Ferenczi and Otto Rank are another appalling example in the history of psychoanalysis. One reason for this acrimony may be that psychoanalysts, like religious or political fundamentalists, are profoundly built into the same world that they theorize about. For example, analysts who are trained in a particular theoretical tradition have spent considerable effort, time, and money in their psychoanalytic education. As students, they are deeply emotionally invested in their demanding training, including the theoretical tradition that guides it. After graduation, analysts frequently practice their profession and publish within the theoretical tradition in which they were trained. They also tend to affiliate with institutes and socialize with colleagues who are compatible with their theoretical outlook. What we are intimating is the extent to which an analyst's professional (and personal) identity and theoretical commitments are fused. In a sense, to be a "Freudian" or "Kleinian" analyst is to participate in a particular mode of "being-in-the-world," one that gives form, direction, and meaning to one's life. Could it be that the acrimony found in psychoanalytic circles, as well as the tendency to insularity and theoretical xenophobia, is related to the fact that analysts are trying to protect the continuity and coherence of their hard-earned identity? Are analysts so mean-spirited when it comes to dealing with their theoretical differences with colleagues because they experience challenge, criticism, and alternative viewpoints as an assault on their way of "being-in-the-world"?

In light of the declared aim of this edited collection, each contributor representing a particular theorist and/or theoretical perspective was asked to answer the following questions:

1. What is your version of the world, your conception of the human condition? What are the central problematics that the individual struggles with within his larger social context?
2. In light of your conception of the human condition, how is individual psychopathology understood?
3. How does this conception of the human condition inform your type of clinical psychoanalysis as it attempts to alleviate individual psychopathology?

The authors were encouraged to state clearly how their position is dissimilar from other theoretical perspectives. Thus, one of the important aims of this book is to help psychoanalysis and psychodynamically oriented psychotherapists acquire a deeper and more comprehensive knowledge of how their theory, both explicitly and implicitly, guides their clinical practice.

This book attempts to provide a fairly comprehensive review of the major theoretical traditions in contemporary psychoanalysis. Since each chapter is separately introduced, we will make only a few general comments here about the structure of the volume.² The opening chapter by Judith Kurzweil provides a historical overview of the field that helps contextualize the subsequent essays. Then follow chapters on Carl Jung (Stein), Alfred Adler (Stein and Edwards), and Karen Horney (Price), followed by selections from the "British School" of object relations, Melanie Klein (Alford), Donald Winnicott (Gargiulo), Ronald Fairbairn (Grotstein), and Wilfred Bion (Eigen). Next we move to Heinz Kohut's important contributions (Ornstein) and the influential interpersonal perspective (Wilner). The chapter by Louis Sass explicates a broadly conceived hermeneutic approach, while Paul Roth examines the innovative contributions of Roy Schafer. The work of R. D. Laing (Thompson), an exemplar of existential psychoanalysis, and the highly original contributions of Jacques Lacan (Olinier) are explored in the next two chapters. Finally, we move to the "feminist" critique (Burack).

It should be mentioned that some of the contributors invited to participate in this volume were chosen because they were not lodged in the "mainstream" psychoanalytic world. For example, Edith Kurzweil, C. Fred Alford, Cynthia Burack, and Paul Roth are not practicing analysts. Rather, they come to this book primarily as psychoanalytically inspired academics. This editorial decision was in keeping with our belief that some of the most interesting work in psychoanalysis, especially as it relates to the issue of situating psychoanalysis in the wider culture, frequently comes from those outside the discipline. Such scholars are often less impeded by the need for psychoanalytic orthodoxy. As Adam Phillips has written,

If a lot of the most interesting psychoanalytic theory and history is now written by people outside the profession, it is partly because the people inside the profession are prone to the kinds of fundamentalism that stifle imagination in the name of something often called professional integrity

(by "fundamentalism" I mean here the assumption that something can only be legitimately criticized from within). (1994, p. 149)

Perhaps at this point the reader is asking, "Where is the Freud chapter?" The answer is that the Freud chapter (Bass) is at the end of the book rather than at the beginning as is usually the case. A few words to explain this seemingly peculiar editorial decision seem necessary.

Freud belongs to the group of authors Michel Foucault calls the "founders of discursivity" (1984, p. 114). Like Homer, Aristotle, the Church fathers, Galileo, and Marx, for example, Freud is unique in that he is not just an author of his own work. He has "produced the possibilities and the rules for the formation of other texts. . . . an endless possibility of discourse" (p. 114). That is, Freud is the point of departure for all psychoanalytic theorizing. He is the author of a theory, tradition, and discipline in which all subsequent psychoanalysts must situate themselves one way or another. Some may agree in whole or in part with Freud while others disagree with his theory. All, however, are beholden to him for making their agreements or divergences possible. In this way, as Foucault points out, Freud has "created a possibility for something other than his discourse, yet something belonging to what he founded" (p. 114). Alan Bass makes a similar point in his Freud chapter when he argues for a psychoanalysis that strives to be more like an endless movement that perpetually undoes itself. This, then, is why the Freud chapter is at the end of the book. It speaks to the need for an open-ended reading of Freud, one that is historically contingent, dynamic, and contestable (Flax, 1993). In this sense, as Bass points out, "the future of psychoanalysis belongs in its Freudian past."

Every anthology, to some extent, reflects the convictions, biases and prejudices of its editors. In other words, what is true for the theories and theorists discussed in this volume is also true for the editors. While this introduction is not the place to situate our book in its personal, historical, and ideological context, we do think it necessary to say something about our perspective as it relates to the aims of this book.

To begin with, early on we were faced with a challenge to the very assumptions of the volume, which forced us to reflect critically on what we thought we were trying to accomplish. Alan Bass (Freud) and Michelle Price (Horney) raised similar objections to our formulation of the three questions that each author was supposed to address. They argued that to ask about Freud or Horney's "conception of the human condition" assumed a systematicity that could be, and should be, objectively observed,

studied, and inscribed. Both Bass and Price, in other words, raised a postmodern criticism about our request to present a theory in terms of a highly formalized, codified series of propositions, one that tends to smooth over complexities, ambiguities, and contradictions. Bass and Price want to articulate psychoanalytic theory in a way that is less susceptible to closure, that is more open-ended and contested. Such an approach would be less limiting and promote greater cross-fertilization among the many different points of view. Bass and Price thus raised very important and "disruptive" questions that forced us to consider another way of problematizing the issues that this book tries to raise. We leave it to the reader to judge the usefulness of each approach for helping us see aspects of the discipline that we have not seen before.

We will conclude by commenting on the one characteristic of this collection that is impossible to miss, namely, the large number and diversity of theories that make up the contemporary psychoanalytic landscape. As Benjamin Wolstein has noted, "the pluralism of working perspectives on psychoanalytic metapsychology may not sit well with those who seek the coherence, orderliness, and authority of a single tradition. Pluralism is, nonetheless, an irrepressible and undeniable fact of contemporary psychoanalytic life" (1993, p. 661).

We believe that the diversity of psychoanalytic theories and clinical approaches does not necessarily reflect conceptual disarray and crisis; rather, it reflects the fact that no one theory has the entire "truth" about the human condition (if we can still speak of such a truth). In today's postmodern world, it is misguided to think otherwise. As Anthony Elliott has pointed out, "no single theory will be able to confront the contemporary, multidimensional identities of the postmodern world. . . . the variety of theories in contemporary psychoanalysis . . . are therefore better understood as images of what it feels like to live in the multidimensional world of modernity" (1994, p. 168). We should recognize that the theoretical differences among contemporary psychoanalysts, at least at this time in psychoanalytic history, are too vast to be meaningfully and effectively bridged. There is little, if any, common ground. Rather, our efforts, he says, might more fruitfully be spent on "the articulation of differences" such that we shall "be able to set psychoanalysis within the wider social context, and to theorize the kinds of political [and social] effects which theories produce" (p. 167). In other words, we hope that through a method of "comparative psychoanalysis," as Schafer has called it, our book will encourage the practitioner to see the profoundly moral com-

ponent to psychoanalytic discourse and practice. Psychoanalytic theorizing and clinical technique should be engaged as a politically inspired and informed social practice lodged in a particular social and historical context with both positive and negative effects. As a discursive formation it can best be judged in terms of yet to be adequately developed "discourse-specific means and tests for the production of knowledge" (Flax, 1993, p. 54). Most important, we hope that our book induces in the reader a more consciously self-critical attitude toward theory and clinical practice, for only then will the discipline better comprehend its potentially "dangerous" side, as Foucault calls it: Psychoanalysis has, says Stephen Frosh (1987, p. 268),

partaken of reactionary political assumptions, has joined in the chorus of voices raised against dissent, has supported the oppression of women, and neglected the extent to which social behaviors and institutions are constructed rather than biologically determined. Psychoanalytic theory has also frequently been conformist, either because of its underlying assumptions or despite them.

Only by a more self-reflexive attitude toward psychoanalysis—about the politics of psychoanalytic knowledge (especially its differing claims about what constitutes the human condition), and about how the profession is situated and operates in our contemporary culture—will the discipline be better able to decide for itself what kind of psychoanalysis it wants and how its future is to be charted.

NOTES

1. The question of what constitutes a discipline is a very complex one. For an extremely interesting treatment of this problem see Foucault (1972, pp. 31-70) and Dreyfus and Rabinow's commentary on Foucault (1983, pp. 58-71).
2. The editors want to acknowledge the following books, which were especially helpful in writing the chapter introductions: Monte (1980), Greenberg and Mitchell (1983), Frosh (1987), and Elliott (1994).

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